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1  Introduction 
In recent decades Western local governments faced several challenges 
(from New Public Management-oriented reforms to Europeanization, from 
decentralization trends to globalization), which put to the test their capacity for 
adaptation to the new social-economic and institutional contexts and often led 
to deep transformations in competencies, functions and also in the relationships 
among territorial levels. 
In this effervescent environment, the phenomenon of inter-municipal 
cooperation (IMC) has gained growing attention, particularly in the last 
few years. Until today, IMC experiences have been mostly analyzed by 
emphasizing their bottom-up features and by focusing on the governance 
processes, which often characterise them. Overall this can be a limit, because 
the still relevant roles of institutional actors and hierarchical elements risk being 
excessively underestimated. In the IMC landscape, in fact, government actors 
and hierarchical features come back in through the regional (where present) 
institutions: actually, the role of the regions in the regulation, coordination and 
steering process of the local cooperation turns out to be decisive.
Thus the hypothesis here is that within the IMC landscape, the issue at 
stake is the complementarity, more than the opposition, between governance 
and government. An attempt will be made to show that the success of local 
territorial policies and reforms, such as the IMC experiences, greatly depend 
on an efficacious balance between deliberative bodies, participatory modalities 
and “free choices” of the local actors, on the one side, and representative 
institutions, hierarchical decisions and centralistic guidelines, on the other 
side. 
This essay will compare IMC and territorial institutional policy in two 
European regions: the Italian Emilia-Romagna and the German Land 
Brandenburg. It will open with an account of the IMC phenomenon, focusing 
on the triggering conditions for its rising (par. 2) and detailing the relationship 
between IMC and the government/governance debate (par. 3). An overview of 
IMC formats and experiences in Italy and Germany (par. 4) and a comparative 
overview of the two case studies (par. 5), will be followed by an in-depth 
analysis of this phenomenon in both regions – Emilia-Romagna in Italy (par. 
6) and Brandenburg in Germany (par. 7). Some comparative findings will then 
be showed (par. 8), before drawing a set of conclusions on government and 
governance in territorial policy of both regions (par. 9). The final part will 
focus on various considerations upon the crucial role of the meso-governments 
in Italy and Germany (par. 10).
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2  Inter-Municipal Cooperation: Rising and Practices
Inter-municipal cooperation is a relatively new phenomenon, although in some 
countries the first examples can be traced back to the 19th century. But even if 
not entirely new as an actual practice, the IMC is surely a novelty as an object 
of analysis and, although still marginal in political science studies, lately has 
gained an increasing attention among scholars in several countries. 
The first important contemporary attempts to group municipalities in 
services delivering and coordination date back to the years of the «pressures 
on local governments’ performance», i.e. about five decades ago (Hulst 
and Van Montfort 2007: 3-7). Since the 60s, increasing demand for public 
services’ quality standards delivered by local government have emerged, 
along with a growing interdependence among local governments, their 
decisions and policies, also due to the enlarging of their inhabitants’ «activity 
space» (ibidem: 3). Later, since the 80s, European integration has triggered 
growing market pressures, which in turn enhanced competition among local 
authorities. The Europeanization process forced local levels to cope with new 
competencies, requirements, standards and regulations, also fostering cross-
border and inter-institutional cooperation practices at all levels, including the 
municipal one; globalisation and glocalisation both promoted and requested 
focused territorial management and development, as well as the use of new 
technologies and e-government instruments. Although such challenges 
involved governments at all levels, local authorities, more than others, had to 
cope with further issues, such as municipal financial crisis, metropolitan areas’ 
growth, suburbanization and city/surroundings relations, as well as the need 
to find a territorial «optimal size» for administration and economy purposes.
During recent decades, pressures, challenges and transformations 
concerning the local levels were therefore manifold and brought about new 
approaches, changes and solution attempts. For example, during the 80s, 
the administrative reform waves taking inspiration from the New Public 
Management and its «doctrinal components» (Hood 1991: 4-5), was thought 
to be a solution in facing overload problems, increasing costs and efficiency 
gaps.
Within this context, IMC was also conceived as a solution in order to 
provide better services, contain costs and cope with growing demands from 
the citizens: a sort of defensive and offensive strategy (Frick and Hokkeler 
2008: 24) for a successful development of local authorities. This is mainly due 
to the fact that IMC couples up two basic principles: local self-government 
and rational governance (Hulst and Van Montfort 2007: 8), by maintaining 
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local authorities’ control over policies and decisions and by institutionalizing 
a governance form for the provision and delivery of these policies. 
Indeed, IMC practices are widespread throughout European countries, 
even if under numerous and often remarkably different formats. Hence, some 
interesting similarities can be singled out. First of all, the reasons behind the 
need, or the will, to cooperate among municipalities are a common feature: 
to provide (or improve) public services, to cut costs, to reach a more efficient 
territorial or demographic dimension for service delivering, to improve 
efficacy and efficiency of existent structures. Secondly, IMC experiences can 
be found both in rural and urban municipalities (Schadly 2008: 5-6), although 
the quite different problems pertaining to these environments (Schmidt 2005: 
10), thus confirming the broad diffusion of this institutional tool. Another 
recurrent cross-country similarity is the variety of services addressed by IMC 
formats, mostly related to the basic tasks of municipal authorities. Some policy 
fields are in fact particularly common – despite deep differences in the various 
countries in terms of autonomy, power, competences, etc. – such as school, 
religion, culture, social care, youth and sport, health care. Finally besides the 
municipal institutions, cooperatives or agencies may be responsible for gas, 
electricity, water, waste supply and management services (Schmidt 2005:18-
19). 
Therefore, this brief overview of the IMC phenomenon highlights its 
importance for local politics and its significance for a better understanding of 
the dynamics currently affecting this institutional level.
3  IMC and Government/Governance Relations at           
 Local Level
In this respect IMC helps to shed light on a most interesting topic from a 
different perspective: the government/governance relations at the local level1. 
The governance concept, as well as its direct link to the government’s, has 
1  The concept of governance has literally crowded many scientific fields from public policy 
analysis to international relations, from State theory to European studies (Profeti 2010: 15-35). 
In this essay we embrace the approach that considers governance as a different, contemporary 
way for the State – and in general for the over-ranked authorities – to exert its power, due to 
growing domestic and global constraints. By referring to the local level and the relations between 
local authorities and regional/state authorities, the topic includes also a multi-level approach (i.e. 
interaction among different levels of government and society).
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been widely studied since the 90s2, mainly with a theoretical approach. In 
recent years, however, a number of more empirical analyses have also been 
conducted, both with a comparative approach and an attention towards regional 
and local levels3. 
How does the inter-municipal cooperation phenomenon involve 
government/governance relations? They are inter-twined in two major ways. 
The first is a mostly theoretical approach. IMCs are part of territorial 
institutional policies and reforms. By territorial institutional policies it is 
here referred to public policies concerning rules and powers of local levels: 
their life, functioning, bodies and activities. These policies shape citizens’ 
institutional opportunities and constraints in local communities and involve 
the territory but also the institutions in charge of managing such territories. In 
this perspective, the IMC practices and their management, provide an excellent 
case of this sort. Using the Lowi (1972) typology, territorial institutional 
policies can be considered «constituent policies». Such policies imply, as it is 
known, a remote likelihood of coercion and an applicability of this coercion 
on the whole environment of conduct. They are ‘public interest policies’ for 
excellence, because they are «large enough in scope to affect a large number 
of people in a consistent way» (Lowi 1972: 308) and can be defined as «rules 
about powers and rules about rules» (Lowi 1985: 74). 
If that holds true – that territorial institutional policies are constituent 
policies –  as a result they imply a strong governmental role. Nevertheless, in the 
specific case of IMC, these policies are also characterized by some governance 
elements, which are often established by law. Indeed, the participation of 
several actors of a different nature is foreseen in an institutional framework of 
cooperation among municipalities, and the (over-ranked) institutional actors 
are entitled to legitimate and even support such participation and governance 
forms. These are typical cases of control and authority shifting by the State 
and of coexistence between hierarchical control and self-regulation (Mayntz 
1999: 9 and 2003: 32). Territorial institutional policies are particularly affected 
by this government/governance overlapping and, from this point of view, IMC 
is a perfect field where both features can be both singled out and coupled in 
interesting way. 
The second way government and governance are inter-twined is an empirical 
one. In both countries considered in this essay (Italy and Germany), territorial 
2  Among the most prominent contributions see: Mayntz and Scharpf (1995), Mayntz (1996 
and 1999), Bulmer (1994), Rhodes (1996 and 1997), Pierre (2000), Kooiman (2003), and, more 
recently, Benz and Dose (2010), Piattoni (2010).
3  Among others: Le Galès (2002), Denters and Rose (2005), Lazin et al. (2007).
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institutional policies and in particular territorial and functional reforms at the 
local level, have been characterized by a major role of the regional institutions, 
i.e. a hierarchically over-ranked level in respect to municipalities. On the one 
hand, empirically these reform processes have been widely voluntary and 
the local authorities’ willingness has been – and still is (or seems to be) – 
fundamental for achieving good results. That includes participatory elements, 
horizontal cooperation, bargaining and negotiating modalities with social 
and economic actors, along with deliberative democracy and citizenship’s 
involvement in political decision-making. In other words, the main features 
of governance have been fully at work. On the other hand, a sort of coercion 
has come to play a role within such policies and reforms, after a certain initial 
stage. Hierarchical forms of power re-entered through the window, after being 
formally thrown out from the door. That is, the government emerged again in 
its classical sense and original meaning: that of steering and exerting control. 
With this in mind, it is thus evident that inter-municipal cooperation, as a 
tool of territorial institutional policy, fully encompasses both governance and 
government mechanisms and dynamics.
Given that, further consideration concerning European Union (EU) and 
the role of municipalities in communitarian arenas, may be useful to better 
understand how IMCs may embody this coexistence. At the European level, 
the municipal level finds itself in an ambiguous position. On the one hand, 
although some important steps forwards have been made in the last 50 years, 
the municipal level appears still quite weak. Only recently the official role of 
municipalities and cities in EU law has been truly recognized, and still in a 
marginal fashion. Therefore some declarations, like the 1985 European Charter 
of Local Self-Government, were – and still are – the first attempts to guarantee 
and protect the local level’s autonomy in a broader context, while also being 
the first contributions of local authorities to the European integration. On the 
other hand, some recent trends could suggest a forthcoming change towards 
an empowerment of local authorities in the EU arenas. Certainly the 2003 
Convention and the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon attained some important goals. 
Moreover, the European integration process cannot be carried on without that 
territorial level, which is closer to the citizens: the municipal level. Horizontal 
cross-border as well as inter-institutional cooperation practices in the EU are 
also highly recommended at all levels4. IMC may thus be a perfectly fitting 
answer to all these challenges and changes: it encompasses bigger territorial 
entities than single municipalities, which may render those new territorial 
4  It should be enough mentioning the Committee of the Regions as inter-institutional cooperation 
and the dozens of Interreg and EGTC projects as crossborders collaboration.
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levels more efficient and powerful, while remaining extremely close to the 
citizens and based on horizontal cooperations, thus fully accomplishing the 
EU guidelines. In other words, municipalities in the EU are still subject to 
over-ranked powers (hierarchical feature) but at the same time they have an 
atout in the radial relations they aim to create (horizontal feature). And IMC 
could be an instrument to help these municipalities to further empower their 
position in the EU. 
4  Inter-Municipal Cooperation in Italy and Germany 
In this section we will focus on how inter-municipal cooperation practices 
have been developed in Italy and Germany. Cooperation among municipalities, 
especially those of small dimensions, is foreseen in both Italian and German 
Constitutions, while in both countries manifold structures are present. Elements 
of similarities as well as differences will emerge in the following overview, 
aimed at providing a general frame where the two regional case studies are 
embedded.
4.1 Italy
Although some forms of IMC had already been used in the past, a formal 
introduction of these cooperation experiences took place only with the 
142/1990 law: an encompassing and radically new legislative act which started 
the big Italian administrative reform of the 90s by entitling local authorities 
with broader competencies and self-administration features. This act made 
inter-municipality possible, although for a long time it remained only on 
paper. The main reason was the compulsoriness of fusion: municipalities were 
fostered to create IMC but then they had necessarily to merge within 10 years. 
Except for very few cases, no municipality chose the path of what they saw as 
an irreversible loss of identity through a compulsory merging with some other 
nearby local authority. Nearly ten years passed in almost total silence, until 
the 267/1999 law reopened the issue. What was new in 1999 – and decisive 
for IMC – were changes concerning the time span of cooperation forms (now 
unlimited), the participants’ dimensions (opened also to municipalities over 
5,000 inhabitants, previously excluded), and above all the voluntary nature 
of cooperation (now clearly stated by abolishing any compulsory merging 
clause). Therefore, for about a decade the IMC in Italy developed at a growing 
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pace, especially in the second half of the 2000s. Lately, between 2008 and 
2010, national and regional laws launched a renewed wave of interest for IMC 
experiences, as will be soon dealt with.
Several varieties of IMC are currently present within the Italian system: 
Conventions (Convenzioni) and Agreements (Accordi); Territorial pacts 
(Patti territoriali) and Zone planes (Piani di area); Consortiums (Consorzi); 
Municipal Unions (Unioni di Comuni) and Mountain Communities (Comunità 
Montane). Very briefly, the first group (conventions, agreements, pacts and 
plans) are forms with no legal entity status and characterized by a certain 
flexibility and mono-functionality, which in some cases denote a policy-
oriented feature, particularly related to social and healthcare fields (Baldini 
et al. 2009: 32). The consortiums are undoubtedly the most “ancient” form 
of IMC (Vandelli 2007, Fedele and Moini 2006), strictly formalized and 
highly institutionalized: they include mostly mono-functional cooperations 
for services delivering as well as inter-municipal and multi-level (i.e. 
between municipalities and provinces) consulting activities. The Municipal 
Unions (MUs) are local authorities entitled by the member municipalities to 
provide certain public services and to manage territorial tasks; they are also 
the format largely and mostly supported by recent legislative developments. 
Finally, the Mountain Communities (MCs), another traditional IMC form in 
Italy, reveal a peculiar feature based on their geographical position (in this 
case, mountainous areas). Mountain Communities share many aspects with 
the MUs: both are proper local authorities and legal entities (while the IMC 
forms in the two other groups are not), and their legal discipline is becoming 
more and more similar. Also, during the last decade, Municipal Unions have 
been steadily growing in Italy, as showed in table 1. While until 1999 (when 
merging was compulsory) only 16 MUs had been established in the whole 
country, a year later (when merging became a voluntary option) their number 
already quadrupled and in a two-year time it increased eightfold and more 
(Baldini et al. 2009: 37). From 2001 onward, the MUs continued to grow until 
they reached the total number of 322 in 2010, even with an uneven distribution 
at national level (ibidem: 38ff., Cittalia 2010: 20-21). As for the MCs5, the 
2008 annual national government budget imposed a drastic reduction of their 
5  Established in 1971 by a national law as local authorities under regional legislation (Vandelli 
2007) the MCs remained untouched until 2008, when the annual national government budget 
foresaw their drastic reduction and a deep revision of membership requirements, aiming at costs 
reduction and administrative simplification (Rosi 2009, Gambino 2009). Therefore the regions 
were forced to revise the MCs operating in their territories, by checking their requirements and 
trying to reduce their total number in just a few months. As a result, the MCs dropped from 300 
to an estimated 185 units (www.uncem.it). The reform was essentially due to the lack of financial 
sustainability by these local authorities.
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number, whilst at the same time State and regions promoted IMC experiences 
under the MU format, encouraging the transformation of MCs into MUs 
through substantial financial incentives (Baldini et al.: 53ff., 59ff.; Xilo and 
Ravaioli 2009: 70ff.). 
Table 1: Number of Municipal Unions and Mountain Communities in Italy 
  per year (1999-2010)
Year Municipal Unions
(MUs)
Mountain
Communities
(MCs) a
1999 16
2000 67
2001 132
2002 179
2003 222
2004 244
2005 (Dec.) 268
2006 (Nov.) 278
2007 (May) 289 300
2008 (Dec.) 290 175 (est.)
2009 (May) 292 185
2010 (June) 313 185 (est.)
2010 (Oct.) 322 (est.) b 185 (est.)
a Provisory and estimated data due to the evolving situation in 2009/2010. The five special status 
regions are not obliged to this revision, being financially autonomous for their local authorities. 
Data thus relate to the 15 ordinary status regions.
b In about five months, from June to October 2010, 9 MUs were created in Emilia-Romagna. Data 
on other regions are not available for the same time span but they may have increased as well, thus 
giving 322 as a (minimum) estimated total number.
Source: Author’s calculation and compilation from Baldini et al. 2009: 38; Xilo e Ravaioli 2009: 
63; Cittalia 2010: 20; www.anci.it; www.uncem.it.
Local Government and Inter-Municipal Cooperation in Italy and Germany
PIFO Occasional Papers No. 12/2011 | Page 13
These last developments show a historical shift from MCs to MUs in the 
inter-municipal cooperation in Italy. If MCs have long played a major role in 
local governments, now MUs seem geared to achieve a prominent position. 
Nowadays MUs are considered in Italy the best IMC form in terms of efficacy 
of policies towards territories and citizens, of efficiency in providing public 
services, and of appropriateness of geographic and demographic dimensions.
To conclude this overview on the Italian situation, an aspect concerning the 
meso-government role – i.e. the regional role – deserves to be here already 
hinted. It must, in fact, be noted that already in the mid-90s other core parts 
of the above-mentioned administrative reform started with the 142/1990 law6, 
focused on the regional role as a pivotal element for the territorial institutional 
policy. From then on, while enhancing the cooperation forms among 
municipalities, the same regions have been achieving a more crucial position. 
Hence the signs of a remarkable position of the meso-governments were quite 
evident since the IMC inception.
4.2 Germany 
Here the IMC stance is rooted in the late nineteenth century, when some forms 
of cooperation were foreseen by the German Empire (Heinz 2007: 91, Schmidt 
2005: 32-51), while actual territorial reforms sprung into life during the 60s and 
70s7. In those years, along with major reforms of the institutional assets and the 
merging of dozens of small municipalities, cooperative approaches were also 
fostered and enhanced, above all between cities and their surroundings (Heinz 
2007: 91). Moreover, IMC in Germany is constitutionally guaranteed according 
to the principle of municipal self-government: the German Constitution (Basic 
Law – Grundgesetz) establishes that «associations of municipalities shall also 
have the right of self-government according to the laws» (art. 28 II). 
The prevalent formats (Frick and Hokkeler 2008: 52ff.; Heinz 2007: 99-
100; Schadly 2008; Schmidt 2005: 25ff.) range from informal cooperations 
and private law cooperation forms (Corp., Ltd., private law agreements and 
associations), both mostly economy-driven, to institutionalized cooperative 
ventures based on public law. These latter experiences can be further 
6  It is here referred to the well-known as the «Bassanini laws», after the Italian Minister of Public 
Function of 1996-2001 centre-left governments, Franco Bassanini, who drafted and proposed the 
reform bills.
7  On this topic see, among others, the well-known contributions of Thieme and Prillwitz (1981), 
and von Unruh et al. (1981).
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subdivided in three main groups. The first group includes their loosest forms, 
such as municipal working communities (kommunale Arbeitsgemeinschaft), 
special working communities (besondere Arbeitsgemeinschaft), and territorial 
cooperations (neighbourhood partnerships – Nachbarschaftsverband, regional 
planning or multi-sector approach associations), all of them established by 
simple private or public law contracts among municipalities. More structured 
solutions are the administrative- or purpose-conventions of the second group, 
among which the most known – and also most used – are the öffentlich-
rechtliche Vereinbarungen, public agreements or conventions among 
municipalities for the delivering and fulfilment of public services8. The main 
feature of these IMC forms is that they do not require the establishment of 
new administrative apparatuses9. Instead, more institutionalized IMC forms in 
this same group are the special-purpose associations (Zweckverbände), which 
are legal personalities and the second most used IMC forms in Germany,10 
combining economic scale purposes with public services delivering 
purposes. To these associations can be transferred a complete, exclusive and 
independent public service and its accomplishment: it is a full-task transfer 
from the member municipalities to the association, and could even include 
just a single task (i.e. water supply, transports, etc.). Zweckverbände are self-
government authorities (although they may also employ municipal public 
servants) but no territorial authorities. Each Land legislation can decide that 
such associations must be established by law to carry on compulsory tasks 
(gesetzlichen Zweckverbände).
Finally, there are also new public authorities (amalgamations, merging and 
fusions of municipal authorities as well as and inter-municipal administrative 
8  According to a study conducted in 2004, this form is used in the 27,7% of the German IMC 
cases (Frick and Hokkeler 2008: 54). They can be created through the transfer of one or more 
public service fulfilment (and responsibility for) from one or more municipalities to another, 
which can provide the required service. How to actually manage this transfer is left to the single 
agreement/convention.
9  A sub-form of the öffentlich-rechtliche Vereinbarungen are the Administrative communities 
(Verwaltungsgemeinschaften), which in some Länder were created during the 60s and 70s 
territorial reforms as an alternative solution to the merging of municipalities imposed by the 
Länder. Born therefore as «not-free» solutions, these forms are now used mainly by those small 
municipalities unable to provide certain public services by themselves (i.e. water supply, firemen, 
cemetery, etc.) (Frick and Hokkeler 2008: 55).
10  Although they could be more properly defined as tasks or competence-association (Schmidt 
2005: 31), according to the above-mentioned 2004 study, this form is used in the 21,7% of the 
German IMC cases (Frick and Hokkeler 2008: 53). They are usually voluntary, but they can also 
be imposed by law if the single municipalities are unable to provide basic public services.
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units11), which represent the third group and are the strongest form of inter-
municipal cooperation, requiring the «establishment of a new public authority 
with its own political and administrative competences and responsibilities 
(apart from the continued existence of its member local authorities)» (Heinz 
2007: 104). According to a 2009 estimate, 1,708 of these newly created inter-
municipal bodies were active on the ground (Wollmann 2010a: 271).
Differently from Italy’s situation, it seems impossible to classify the 
German IMC forms in a more precise way. Plenty of models, classifications 
and analytical outlines have been proposed both in practice and in scientific 
literature – though quite often disregarding essential or functioning aspects 
of these cooperative forms (Hesse and Götz 2006: 13-14). It is also true that 
in Germany countless options are available for any municipality interested in 
getting involved in an inter-municipal experience (ibidem: 18). Contrary to the 
Italian case, in Germany there is no federal law establishing whether a form of 
IMC can be considered as a local authority. Each Land handles and disciplines 
autonomously its own different IMC formats and options. The reason for this 
difference is to be traced back to the unitary versus the federal constitutional 
architecture of the two countries: in Italy a comprehensive national normative 
Act (Tuel12) defines what in Germany is instead left to each Land legislation.
Despite this distinction, some similarities between the two countries 
concerning IMC and territorial institutional policy can definitely be singled 
out. Both countries have a similar municipal background, originating from 
the medieval territorial tradition, that is, a thick territorial settlement with 
many medium and small municipalities (see table 2). Moreover, as in many 
other countries, also in Italy and Germany a distinction occurs between urban 
and rural areas (and among IMCs in both contexts): in urban areas, problems 
related to demographic concentrations and metropolitan surroundings are 
highly present, even if both countries do not seem to properly address these 
issues yet13. These quick hints already give the impression that IMC could 
11  These units are known with a different name in each Land, i.e. Verwaltungsgemeinschaften in 
Bavaria, Thuringia, Saxony-Anhalt and Saxony, Vereinbarte Verwaltungsgemeinschaft in Baden-
Württemberg, Ämter in Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Schleswig-Holstein.
12  Legislative Decree 267/2000 Testo Unico delle leggi sull’Ordinamento degli Enti Locali – 
Tuel.
13  In Germany these are the Verdichtungsräume or Ballungsräume. Since the territorial reforms of 
the 60s and 70s the debate has continued on the necessity of creating two region-wide authorities: 
regional city (Stadtkreis) and regional county (Landkreis) (Heinz 2007: 104) but no step was 
made in this direction (see also Hesse 2005 for city-surroundings relations). In Italy these areas 
are named metropolitan areas (and cities). Established with the 142/1990 law, they periodically 
emerged in the political debate (Vandelli 2000), and were recently included in the fiscal federalism 
law 42/2009, but they still have to be effectively created (Dente 2010).
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represent an interesting field of investigation in both contexts. This holds 
particularly true when analyzing regions where certain IMC forms are almost 
two-decade old and quite well consolidated.
Table 2: Number of municipalities according to population in Italy and   
  Germany (2010)
Population Italy Germany
< 500 832 2,280
500-1,000 1,108 1,940
1,000-2,000 1,593 2,030
2,000-5,000 2,160 2,364
5,000-10,000 1,195 1,300
10,000-20,000 690 884
20,000-50,000 367 510
50,000-100,000 104 107
100,000-200,000 30 43
200,000-500,000 9 24
>500,000 6 14
Total 8,094 11,496
Source: Author’s compilation from official data: Statistisches Bundesamt, Quartal Ausgabe 
June 2010: www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/Statistiken/
Regionales/Gemeindeverzeichnis/Administrativ/AdministrativeUebersicht,templateId=renderPri
nt.psml  (data up to Dec 31, 2008) (last access: October 25, 2010); www.ancitel.it/sindaci/index.
cfm (last access: October 21, 2010).
In the following paragraphs, the analysis will concentrate on the strongest, 
more structured and institutionalized IMC forms in both countries, that is, 
those which imply the creation of a supra-municipal local authority and where 
a proper new institution is being born. This choice allows us to compare two 
IMC forms sharing common features in the two chosen regions (Emilia-
Romagna in Italy and Land Brandenburg in Germany). The similar IMC forms 
are the Municipal Unions (MUs) in Emilia-Romagna and the inter-municipal 
administrative units called Ämter in Brandenburg. 
Both these entities have legal personalities (being territorial authorities); 
they manage proper revenues, tasks, and administration; provide a 
multipurpose orientation in public service delivering and fulfilment; are 
entitled with indirect democratic legitimacy (being indirectly elected), but also 
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with political responsibility and accountability in respect to the transferred 
functions under their power. 
Going more in detail, other similar organizational features allow us a 
fruitful comparison between these two IMC forms: both authorities in Emilia-
Romagna and Brandenburg are governed by a decision-making steering 
board, elected by the municipal Councils of the member municipalities and 
composed by the mayors of the member municipalities and other members 
from the municipal councils. Their boards manage tasks transferred to the 
IMC by the member municipalities (or by the region, Land or state) and may 
employ proper personnel. Member municipalities also fund these tasks with 
their budgets (often with additional support by the region or Land)14.
Moreover, these IMC forms are both characterized by a voluntary-based 
origin but (as explained in detail further on) also by a later intervention of an 
over-ranked authority, i.e. the region in Italy and the Land in Germany. For all 
these reasons, a MUs and Ämter comparison may be highly productive and 
may also allow us to analyze both governance and government dynamics — 
along with their respective role within the IMC field.
5  Case Studies: A Comparative Overview
Before detailing the Emilia-Romagna and Brandenburg’s experiences in inter-
municipal cooperation, here below we will provide some comparative tables 
about these two regions. 
As shown in table 3, despite a comparable area and a similar number 
of municipalities (Brandenburg exceeds Emilia-Romagna by about 70 
municipalities), still the two regions offer some differences in size and 
distribution. While in Brandenburg more than 50% of its Gemeinden count 
less than 2,000 inhabitants (52,7%, that is 221 up to 419), Emilia-Romagna 
includes only 14,4% of its comuni in this category (50 up to 347). Vice versa, 
while Brandenburg has only four cities over 50,000 inhabitants (and none 
over 200,000), in Emilia-Romagna there are 13 of such cities, one with more 
14  Of course, there are also some clear differences. For instance, while the Ämter must have 
proper personnel to manage their tasks, MUs are encouraged but not obliged to provide a similar 
staff, since this is a function that member municipalities may or may not decide to transfer to the 
IMC. Again, the Ämter have an administrative director to coordinate the personnel in fulfilling the 
IMC tasks, while the MUs do not foreseen this task, leaving it to the mayors’ steering board. Above 
all, it is the scope and range of their functions, and their territorial extension, which may vary and 
may eventually differentiate the Ämter and the Municipal Unions.
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than 200,000 people (the region capital, Bologna). Nonetheless, as said, both 
countries have a similar tradition of municipal development and rooting, tracing 
back to the Middle Ages, which explains the high number of municipalities, 
and in particular the still remarkable presence of small and medium size 
municipalities. In this respect, however, Germany (here Brandenburg) shows 
a higher incidence of this category than Italy (here Emilia-Romagna), as 
shown in table 3, especially in the cumulative values column. This feature 
is particularly important from an IMC perspective. Small municipalities are 
more vulnerable in the context of transformations and challenges like those 
described in paragraph 2. They suffer most from financial, organizational, 
dimensional and expertise problems, from an overload of demands and 
a lack of supply in public services as well as from difficulties in fulfilling 
compulsory tasks. It is thus largely for the small municipalities that IMC has 
often been looked at as a possible solution. And it is not by chance that in both 
Emilia-Romagna and Brandenburg most of municipalities involved in IMC 
experiences have a small or medium size.  
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As far as the IMC is concerned, table 4 shows more in details the varieties and 
quantity of IMC forms mostly active in the two regions. In Emilia-Romagna 
the MUs have become, in the last couple of years, the first IMC form including 
more than 30 units. The very last impulse to this rise was given by the regional 
law n. 10/2008, which established that within September 2009 half of the 
previous 18 MCs should transform into MUs or be integrated into existing 
MUs. Along with 31 MUs, 10 MCs still continue to exist, along with 11 
Intermunicipal Associations – another form of IMC slightly looser than MUs, 
as will be soon explained. In Brandenburg, along with 53 Ämter, there are 79 
Zweckverbände operating on the ground. As said earlier, these are not local 
authorities but rather different IMC forms based on self-governing special-
purpose associations. They may couple with – and somehow overlap with – 
Emilia-Romagna Brandenburg
Area (km2) 22.123 29.481
Inhabitants (N) 4.293.825 2.522.493
Population N 
municipalities
% cumulative 
values
N 
municipalities
% cumulative
 values
< 500 3 0,9 -- 11 2,6 --
500-1,000 16 4,6 19 (5,5) 131 31,3 142 (33,9)
1,000-2,000 31 8,9 50 (14,4) 79 18,8 221 (52,7)
2,000-5,000 106 30,5 156 (44,9) 74 17,7 295 (70,4)
5,000-10,000 96 27,6 252 (72,5) 52 12,4 347 (82,8)
10,000-20,000 61 17,6 313 (90,1) 44 10,5 391 (93,3)
20,000-50,000 21 6,1 334 (96,2) 24 5,7 415 (99,0)
50,000-100,000 4 1,2 338 (97,4) 2 0,5 417 (99,5)
100,000-200,000 8 2,3 346 (99,7) 2 0,5 419 (100,0)
200,000-500,000 1 0,3 347 (100,0) -- -- --
>500,000 -- -- -- -- -- --
Total 347 100,0 419 100,0
Table 3: Area, inhabitants, population, number and percentage of 
  municipalities in Emilia-Romagna and Brandenburg (2009/2010)
Source: Author’s compilation from official data. For Brandenburg (data up to 2009): Statistisches 
Jahrbuch Brandenburg 2009 (2009: 26) at www.statistik-berlin-brandenburg.de (last access: 
October 25, 2010); Statistisches Bundesamt, Quartal Ausgabe June 2010: www.destatis.de/jetspeed/
portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/Statistiken/Regionales/Gemeindeverzeichnis/
Administrativ/AdministrativeUebersicht,templateId=renderPrint.psml. For Italy (data up to 
2010):  www.ancitel.it/sindaci/index.cfm (last access: October 25, 2010).
Local Government and Inter-Municipal Cooperation in Italy and Germany
PIFO Occasional Papers No. 12/2011 | Page 20
one or more Ämter (or part of), being devoted to a specific task (i.e. water 
supply, waste management) that municipalities can decide to transfer to these 
associations, leaving to the relevant Amt other public services to fulfil.
Table 4: Inter-municipal cooperations forms in Emilia-Romagna and   
  Brandenburg (2010)
N municipalities N and type of IMC forms
Emilia-
Romagna
347 31 a
Municipal 
Unions 
10
Mountain 
Communities 
11
Intermunicipal 
Associations 
Brandenburg 419 53 
Ämter
79  
Zweckverbände
a  In this number has been included the only case of Circondario (the Nuovo Circondario Imolese) 
– another IMC form – still existing in Emilia-Romagna. Because its functions, operating fields and 
statute are very similar to those of MUs, it has been incorporated in this category. Data in this table 
and in the following ones do thus count also this unit.
Source: Author’s compilation from regional official data. For Emilia-Romagna: www.servizi.
regione.emilia-romagna.it/AnagraficaEELLconsultazione/RicercaAvanzataEnte.aspx (last access : 
October 26, 2010). For Brandenburg: Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg, Ämter Verzeichnis 
Gebietsstand 01.03.2009 www.statistik-berlin-brandenburg.de; service.brandenburg.de/lis/list.
php?page=behoerdenverzeichnis_art&sv[adr_art]=zv_*&_grid=Zweckverbände (last access: 
October 27, 2010).
Table 5 shows instead the total number of municipalities currently experiencing, 
in the two regions, the IMC forms (Municipal Unions and Ämter) which are 
the subject of our analysis. Again, most data are comparable. Almost half of 
the 347 municipalities in Emilia-Romagna (47,6%) belong to a MU, against 
the 271 (64,7%) in Ämter of the 419 Brandenburg municipalities. But if we 
also consider the Emilia-Romagna municipalities which are members of 
Mountain Communities or Intermunicipal Associations, then the total number 
of municipalities involved in various IMC forms rises to 310 units and to an 
amazing 89,3%15. Of particular interest is the average size of IMC bodies in 
15  We should remember that in Emilia-Romagna also Mountain Communities and Intermunicipal 
Associations are IMC forms with the status of local territorial authorities, though with some 
different features from MUs. Thus, here they are important in order to measure the  “propensity’s 
degree for institutionalized IMC” in the region. On the contrary, in Brandenburg the Ämter are the 
only IMC form entitled with territorial authority status and therefore the only one that must be 
“counted” for our purpose here. 
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both regions: the average number of municipalities involved in MUs or Ämter 
is quite similar, ranging from 5 to 6 municipalities.
Table 5: Number, percentage and average number of municipalities in MUs 
  or Ämter (2010)
Total N 
municipalities
N municipalities 
in MUs or Ämter
% Average N 
municipalities in 
MUs or Ämter
Emilia-
Romagna
347 165 
(310) a
47,6
(89,3) a
5,3
(6,0) a
Brandenburg 419 271 64,7 5,1
a  Data in parenthesis refer to the total N, percentage and average N of municipalities in IMCs 
in Emilia-Romagna, considering also the Mountain Communities and the Interregional 
Associations. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on regional official data. For Emilia-Romagna: www.regione.
emilia-romagna.it/wcm/gestioni_associate/sezioni_laterali/esperienze_atto.htm (last access: 
October 27, 2010); for Brandenburg: Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg, Ämter Verzeichnis 
Gebietsstand 01.03.2009 www.statistik-berlin-brandenburg.de.
The data presented here give further support to the idea of an interesting 
comparability of the two regions and of the IMC forms they employ. In order 
to verify this idea, we will now focus more deeply on the two case studies.
6  Emilia-Romagna: A Front Line Region
Situated in Northern Central Italy, Emilia-Romagna is one of the few Italian 
regions that dealt with IMC, anticipating other regions and well before the 
national legislation would compel them to do so. Being able to root this 
approach on a long tradition of very tight relations with the local level, both 
at the municipal and the other sub-regional territorial levels and institutions, 
Emilia-Romagna already in 1996 issued a regional law disciplining the 
territorial management, promoting inter-municipal merging and integration; 
and in 1999 an innovative form of IMC, the Intermuncipal Association (IAs - 
Associazione intercomunale) was created and then spread all over the country. 
It was the loosest and more flexible form of MU, established to promote IMC 
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when the merging among municipalities was still compulsory after building a 
municipal union (Baldini et al. 2009, 56-57). 
In 1999 and 2000 some national legislative interventions radically changed 
the general vision about IMC in the country: instead of compulsory fusions, 
IMCs were fostered with the aim of promoting cooperation among local 
authorities at large. This was to be achieved, on the one hand, by entitling 
the meso-governments (that is, the regions) with decisional powers about the 
«optimal dimensional size» of IMCs as well as with financial powers about 
incentives and aids to the IMC forms. On the other hand, municipalities 
retained the freedom to choose which form of IMC they preferred. It was 
with these national acts that the already mentioned removal of the compulsory 
merging was introduced. 
Emilia-Romagna very soon implemented this new approach to territorial 
management and decentralization. Already with the 3/1999 regional law, this 
region had abolished (art. 16) the so-called regional «substitutive power», 
which enabled itself to intervene where local authorities lacked in providing 
services or compulsory tasks or in fulfilling norms16. Then, with the regional 
law 11/2001, IMC received a remarkable and definitive push in Emilia-
Romagna. The 11/2001 law encouraged the willingness and freedom of inter-
municipal cooperation and benefited long-term experiences (Regione Emilia-
Romagna 2003: 4-5). It enhanced only structured and institutionalized inter-
municipal cooperation forms (as IAs, MUs and MCs) and discouraged their 
territorial overlapping. It also focused the financial resources and incentives 
on those IMCs, which most integrated services and functions as well as their 
personnel. This trend was then extended by subsequent norms17, all of them 
stressing that IMC «should be conceived less and less a mere organizational 
feature for services and functions and more and more a basic cell of the 
networked system of local administrations» (Regione Emilia-Romagna 2005: 
56).
The following turning point for IMC in Emilia-Romagna came in 2006. 
In this year State financial incentives for IMCs, which until then had been 
established at the national level, moved under the responsibility of the same 
16  The 3/1999 regional law also introduced the Region-Local autonomies Conference as an 
instrument for linking the executives at the different levels (art. 25), with the aim of ensuring 
provinces and municipalities’ participation to the decision-making processes concerning local 
authorities (art. 27), also through the so-called negotiated planning (programmazione negoziata) 
(art. 33).
17  For example with the 6/2004 regional law, which implemented the 2001 Constitutional reform 
of Title V, and with the new regional Statute (13/2005 regional law).
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regions (the so-called «regionalisation of State funds» for IMCs). From then 
on, the State distributes money to those regions accomplishing certain IMC 
requisites; but it is then up to each region to establish funding and redistribution 
criteria among its IMCs. The agreement between State and regions on this 
point18 also stressed that regional legislations should focus on MUs and MCs, 
being those «not only functional structures for service delivering, but also 
(…) representative bodies and local territories’ authorities» (Xilo and Ravaioli 
2009: 61). 
These last changes reinforced in Italy, and of course in Emilia-Romagna, a 
trend – the empowering of regional meso-governments in dealing with IMC 
matters – whose beginning can be traced back to the eve of the decade, with 
the already mentioned State interventions in 1999 and 2000. And the ensuing 
acts, in the years 2008 and 2009, also went in the same direction. 
As previously hinted, at the end of 2007 the annual national government 
budget (Legge finanziaria 2008) launched an indirect territorial reform by 
forcing regions to cut in number the traditional IMC form of the Mountain 
Communities. Regions therefore had to implement this norm and to arrange 
the number and borders of their own MCs accordingly. Emilia-Romagna 
government reduced and reorganized its own MCs with the 10/2008 and 
22/2008 regional laws and with a further act in May 2009. It also decided a 
restructuring and simplification of the regional public service system (i.e. by 
prohibiting – and no longer only discouraging – IMC territorial overlappings 
and by introducing even stricter funding criteria). This decision turned out to 
be in practice an extremely strong incentive for pluri-functional IMCs with 
legal entities status, such as the MUs and the reformed MCs (Baldini et al. 
2009: 71, 161)19. 
In 2009 and 2010 the state enhanced again fusions and MUs establishing 
that small municipalities under 5,000 inhabitants should cooperate or 
18  The agreement was reached during a meeting of the State-Regions-Local Authorities Unified 
Conference, the body created in 1997 merging the State-Regions- and the State-Cities and Local 
Autonomies Conferences with the aim of fostering cooperation and negotiation among the state 
and territorial authorities.
19  It must be underlined that all along these years the regional government in Emilia-Romagna 
did not change in terms of political color. Centre-left governments succeeded to one another in 
the time span covered in this essay. This feature may be of interest if considered that instead 
in Brandenburg – as it will be explained in paragraph 6 – a political alternation took place. 
Nonetheless, on the one side, this aspect will not be further explored here and, on the other side, 
several researches show that political orientation of the ruling governments seems to have only a 
limited impact, if any, on the IMC issues and on their management (Baldini et al. 2009: 172-173), 
as well as on territorial reforms (Bogumil 2007: 5).
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establish an MU in order to provide «local authorities’ basic functions» such 
as public administration, police, school, social services. Moreover it stressed 
the responsibility and decision-making entitlement of the regional meso-
government in this process20.
The consequence of these last decisions was twofold. On the one hand 
regions definitively attained a dominant role in the IMC management: they 
were entitled by the State to manage and decide most of the territorial policy 
issues, and they used these new powers accordingly. Some regions – and 
among them Emilia-Romagna – opted for a “full acceptance” of this role, 
implementing it effectively through their regional laws. On the other hand 
the IMC form of the Municipal Union was impressively empowered, thus 
becoming the first type in Italy and, as already seen, in Emilia-Romagna. 
Tables 6-8 try to account for this last evolution in Emilia-Romagna.
Table 6: Evolution of inter-municipal cooperation forms in Emilia-Romagna  
  (2000-2010)
Year Municipal 
Unions
Mountain 
Communities
Intermunicipal 
Associations
2000 2 18 13
2001 3 18 22
2002 6 18 25
2003 7 18 26
2005 8 18 26
2007 12 18 22
2008 July 12 18 18
2008 Oct. 16 18 18
2009 Jan. 17 18 15
2009 May 20 18 (9) a 15
2010 Oct. 31 10 11
a The number into parenthesis indicates the number of MCs the national law encouraged to reach in 
Emilia-Romagna. Finally their ultimate number reached 10 with one “old” MC fulfilling the new 
requisites and nine  new bodies called “New Mountain Communities”.
Source: Author’s compilation from regional data in Regione Emilia-Romagna 2005: 66; Regione 
Emilia-Romagna 2003: 12, 14; since 2007: periodical reports on www.unioni.anci.it; www.
regione.emilia-romagna.it/gestioni_associate/ (last access: October 26, 2010).
20  By the 42/2009 law on fiscal federalism enacting the art. 119 of the Constitution and by the 
annual national government budget (artt. 26-31, 122/2010 law).
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Table 7: Number and percentage of municipalities in IMC forms in Emilia- 
  Romagna (Situation as of October 2010)
IMC form N %
Municipalities in MUs 165 47,6
Municipalities in MCs 95 27,4
Municipalities in IAs 50 14,3
No IMC member 37 10,7
Total 347 100,0
Source: Author’s calculation from regional official data available at www.regione.emilia-romagna.
it/gestioni_associate (last access: October 26, 2010).
Table 8: Number of municipalities and population in Municipal Unions in  
  Emilia-Romagna (Evolution 2003-2010)
Year N municipalities in MUs Population in MUs
2003 27 123.897
2005 36 211.493
2009 108 937.464
2010 (June) 122 1.083.481
2010 (Oct.) 165 1.385.883
Source: Author’s calculation and compilation from data available in Regione Emilia-Romagna 
2003: 11; Regione Emilia-Romagna 2005: 62; Baldini et al. 2009: 41; Cittalia 2010: 24, 28; 
wwwservizi.regione.emilia-romagna.it/AnagraficaEELLconsultazione/RicercaAvanzataEnte.
aspx; www.ancitel.it/sindaci/index.cfm (last access: October 28, 2010).
A Permissive and Assertive Approach to IMC
Which interpretation can be given to the data and narration presented until 
now? 
Three phases can be singled out in the IMC experience in Emilia-Romagna: 
a first phase (1996-2001), a second one (2001-2006) and a third phase (2006-
present). The first one represents the «beginning of IMC» – still constrained by 
the 142/90 national law, imposing rigid criteria – with the pioneering entering 
of Emilia-Romagna in this field with the regional laws of 1996 and 1999. The 
second stage is the «first IMC take off». Fostered by the new national approach 
of the 265/1999 law and the 267/2000 Tuel, this phase is characterized by an 
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IMC mushrooming, especially in the forms of MUs and (at that time) mostly 
IAs. The third phase is the «second IMC take off», which started with the 
«regionalisation of State funds» for IMCs in 2006, was pushed by the changed 
approach at the national level and was then decisively fostered by the 2008-
2010 national and regional acts. In 2010 the ultimate implementation of 
these changes ended: most of the “old” MCs disappeared and/or converted 
into MUs, most of IAs commuted into MUs, as well as existing and newly 
created MUs now fulfil the new criteria for local authorities and horizontal 
cooperation. A consolidation stage is thus probably to start from 2011 on, 
which will allow further analysis in order to evaluate the results and evolution 
of these changes.
Apart from the various phases, it is worth underlining that Emilia-
Romagna has always shown a remarkable interest in territorial institutional 
policy, in particular in its IMC aspect. It was among the first regions in Italy 
to provide regional legislation on this issue, also with innovative features; 
the first region to apply the territorial management plan as an instrument for 
territorial development and regulation (also in the IMC respect); and among 
the few Italian regions to significantly boost this kind of network among 
municipalities. Not only that: The creation of a unique and innovative form of 
IMC, the Intermunicipal Association, may be read as a sign of a particularly 
strong role and engagement of this region in the whole issue. Emilia-Romagna 
invented this cooperation form in order to induce municipalities to associate, 
but without letting them feel constrained by rigid formal rules. A courageous 
and assertive step if considering that in the first phase IMC rules were quite 
stringent and no other region had significantly taken any initiative in this field. 
Nearly a decade later, in the third phase, the IA form began to be discouraged 
in favour of more institutionalized IMC formats (Baldini et al. 2009), with the 
result that MUs are nowadays the most fostered inter-municipal cooperation 
forms. Once again, the region Emilia-Romagna anticipated the national course 
and/or immediately implemented innovations. In time, regional funds had 
in fact begun to decrease for IAs in favor of MUs and regional legislation 
in 2008-2009 formally helped the transformation of these (now inadequate) 
forms into MUs. 
Generally speaking, the Emilia-Romagna approach to territorial institutional 
policy and IMC may be therefore depicted as «permissive and assertive», that 
means allowing municipalities to organize as they wished but within a solid 
framework established by the region itself. 
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7 The Brandenburg Way to Territorial Policy
Brandenburg lies around the federal capital and city-state of Berlin and is 
one of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) Länder, nowadays 
called new Länder or Eastern Länder. Its territorial institutional policy 
begins with the German reunification in 1990, the ensuing restoration of the 
Land and the return to an effective self-government of its territorial entities 
(districts and municipalities). In the following decade Eastern Länder, among 
other major challenges, also had to cope with territorial reforms, where they 
tried to implement the same path followed by the Western Länder a couple 
of decades before (Jeffery 1999 and 2003, Wollmann 2004). A major feature 
in Brandenburg is therefore that the IMC issue cannot be disjoined from the 
territorial reforms. As will be seen, IMC solutions have in fact always been 
coupled with the need for a territorial and functional restructuring of the 
municipal entities, mostly in the direction of their reduction.
Just after the reunification, the high number of municipalities, in 
particular those of small size (in 1991 around 65% of the 1,793 Brandenburg 
municipalities were under 500 inhabitants, see table 9), pushed the Land 
administration toward the first IMC initiative, along with the first municipal 
administrative reform21. 
21  Büchner and Franzke (2002: 98) clearly state that «according to West Germany experience, 
more than 90% of municipalities in Brandenburg, just for their size, were unable to create an 
effective municipal autonomy».
Local Government and Inter-Municipal Cooperation in Italy and Germany
PIFO Occasional Papers No. 12/2011 | Page 28
Table 9: Evolution of municipalities in Brandenburg according to number 
  and size (1990-2009)
Year a Total N 
municipalities
Population
<500 500-
2,000
2,000-
5,000
5,000- 
10,000
10,000- 
20,000
>20,000
1990 1,775 1,145 448 97 38 22 25
1991 1,793 1,169 447 93 37 22 25
1992 1,793 1,181 436 92 37 23 24
1993 1,813 1,192 443 95 36 23 24
1994 b n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
1995 1,696 1,096 426 91 34 25 24
1996 1,696 1,090 432 89 36 25 24
1997 1,696 1,088 432 90 37 24 25
1998 1,565 957 425 87 46 25 25
1999 1,489 874 423 96 45 26 25
2000 1,479 861 423 95 47 28 25
2001 1,474 861 414 95 50 29 25
2002 1,092 511 372 96 59 30 24
2003 886 331 341 97 59 34 24
2004 438 19 218 74 54 46 27
2005 421 6 214 73 55 46 27
2006 c 420 7 213 72 58 43 27
2007 420 8 213 72 57 42 28
2008 c 420 9 213 72 55 43 28
2009 d 420 11 211 74 52 44 28
a  Data as of  January 1, every year except for 2006, 2008 and 2009.
b Data for 1994 not available in the retrieved source (Deutscher Staedtetag, Statistisches Jahrbuch 
Deutscher Gemeinden).
c Data as of December 31, 2005 and 2007, respectively.
d Data as of December 31, 2008.
Source: From 1990 to 2005 and for 2007, Deutscher Staedtetag, Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher 
Gemeinden; for 2006 and 2008, Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg, Statistisches Jahrbuch 
Brandenburg 2008: 26; for 2009, Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg, Statistisches Jahrbuch 
Brandenburg 2009: 26 at www.statistik-berlin-brandenburg.de.
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In fact, in 1991 a first IMC form was created: the administrative units called 
“offices” (Ämter). In 1993 the Land parliament approved the Land municipal 
constitution (Brandenburger Kommunalverfassung) which replaced that of 
GDR and which was the result of an in-depth examination of other Länder 
experiences, in order to provide an adequate legislation for local authorities 
(Büchner and Franzke 2002: 92-93). This constitutional act also encompassed 
the Ämter legislation (AmstO) and their institutional rights and guarantees 
as well as the so-called “soft” territorial reform (Berg and Möller 1997: 
3), which consisted in pursuing a bigger municipalities‘ average size and 
better management‘s capacity of local authorities. In this period the Land 
Brandenburg chose to introduce «‘a soft double-barrelled’ strategy in which 
small-size municipalities with elected local councils were retained while, 
at the same time, a new layer of inter-communal bodies was introduced» 
(Wollmann 2010b: 81)22, in a sort of dual structure. This strategy included two 
different steps. In a first phase, the «Brandenburg way» was a volunteer way 
(freiwilliger Weg) through which (mostly small) municipalities had to merge 
and form bigger entities without a coercive top-down decision by the Land. 
Later, when the deadlines set up by the Land for municipalities to voluntarily 
merge, cooperate, join together were over, the Land should intervene by 
forcing local authorities to follow its guidelines. 
The soft approach led to a modest but not insignificant success, as shown in 
table 10, which displays the evolution of Ämter and merging in Brandenburg 
along the years. In the second half of the 90s, 1,636 municipalities created 
158 Ämter: an average of about 11 municipalities with 8,000 inhabitants thus 
constituted an Amt (Büchner and Franzke 2002: 100, Berg and Möller 1996: 
7), comprising around 97% of all Brandenburg municipalities (Wollmann 
2010b: 80). During the 90s this IMC solution was thus extremely important 
because it helped create a solid base for the development of the renewed local 
authorities in Brandenburg after the reunification.
Nonetheless, the Ämter solution left the single municipalities, their identities 
and existence untouched: municipalities simply had to join for administrative 
purposes, without anything to compel political and territorial merging. The 
Brandenburg Ämter legislation – and in general the dual-structured, soft 
Brandenburg way – was so conceived also for political reasons: soon after 
having re-conquered autonomy and identity as local authorities, it would have 
been hard to ask municipalities to renounce to part of their powers in favour of 
22  Among the five Eastern Länder only Saxony opted for a radical reform by compulsorily 
merging small municipalities into bigger ones, while the other opted for the same soft solution 
adopted in Brandenburg.
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an over-ranked authority (Berg 2002: 22). Moreover, a sort of respect was paid 
to civil society and local level groups, which had helped in overthrowing the 
Communist regime, by preserving their small-size identity (Wollmann 2010a: 
271-273 and 2010b: 81). 
At the turn of the decade, however, problems and critics began to come 
to surface with the consequence that «operational and democratic deficits 
of the dual structure have been increasingly addressed» (Wollmann 2010a: 
274). Among the main critics, those addressing the shrinking organization 
and loosing of skills and competences by the smaller municipalities, and 
those concerning the lacking legitimacy and accountability of Ämter due to 
their indirect elections, were surely the most striking (Wollmann 2010a: 273-
274). The accountability deficit was also boosted by the fact that along time, 
more and more often member municipalities had chosen to transfer also some 
decision-making powers to the Ämter (especially in the fields of territorial 
development, schools, urban planning), not only some administrative tasks 
(Büchner and Franzke 2002: 99)23. In the praxis the Ämter were thus becoming 
stronger and more political IMC form, a landscape not so different from the 
Emilia-Romagna Municipal Unions. 
Parallel to this de facto political empowerment of the Ämter, another 
IMC form spread in Brandenburg: the special-purpose associations 
(Zweckverbände), entitled with special tasks to be managed by their own 
administrative organization. Particularly for small municipalities, this step 
brought along problems of representation and membership in so many entities 
(Büchner and Franzke 2002: 104), along with over-institutionalization 
problems (Wollmann 2008: 258).
 Due to this widespread discontent and manifold critics, just after the 
approval of AmstO and the Kommunalverfassung in 1993, a debate about a 
revision of the territorial units started up. But no real reform followed. The 
proposals of merging, enlargement and formal political entitlement of Ämter 
were rejected both by local representatives and by the population, finding 
obstacles in the deeply rooted century-long German local identities and in the 
capability of municipal authorities to influence Land policies (Gabriel and 
Eisenmann 2005: 136). Nevertheless, a series of four Land legislative acts 
between 1992 and 1996 took place (ibidem: 104) in order to promote and 
support free mergers and incorporation of single municipalities in bigger cities 
with border modifications and inclusion as cities’ departments. These acts were 
however not particularly successful (Berg 2002: 25; Berg and Möller 1997: 
23  The accountability deficit problem is shared with Italy’s and Emilia-Romagna’s Municipal 
Unions which are addressed with the very same critical issues (Baldini et al. 2009: 159ff.).
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4ff.), at least until 1997, when a new push for territorial institutional policy 
took place. In the following years mergers were more successful, as shown 
in table 10, and municipalities effectively started using the volunteer option 
of merging so that the total number of municipalities began to considerably 
decrease in the following years (see again table 9).
Table 10: Evolution of IMC, Ämter and mergers in Brandenburg (1992-2010)
Total N 
municipalities
N municipalities 
NOT in Ämter a
N municipalities 
in Ämter
N 
Ämter
N 
mergers b
1992 1,793 54 1,733 160
1995 1,696 56 1,636 158 4
1996 1,696 56 1,636 158 --
1997 1,700 60 1,636 158 60
1998 1,565 61 1,499 153 51
1999 1,489 62 1,423 152 9
2000 1,479 62 1,413 152 4
2001 1,474 62 1,408 152 172
2002 1,092 82 1,006 130 108
2003 886 89 793 122 83
2004 438 147 287 122
2005 421 145 272 54
2006 420 144 272 54
2007 420 144 272 54
2009 419 144 271 53
2010 419 144 271 53
a  To this number the 4 district- and Amt-free cities (6 until 1993) must be always added.
b The number of mergers (of one or more) municipalities occurring in a year have their effect on the 
number of municipalities the following year (or some years later) due to bureaucratic procedures.
Source: Author’s adaptation and compilation from: 1992 to 2006, Deutscher Staedtetag, Statistisches 
Jahrbuch Deutscher Gemeinden; for 2007 and 2009, für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg, Verzeichnis 
Gebietsstand 01.03.2007 and 01.03.2009 at www.statistik-berlin-brandenburg.de; www.
mi.brandenburg.de/cms/list.php?page=mi_sg_zusammenschluesse&sv[topics246]=51921&_
grid=2003 (last access: Nov. 4, 2010); for 2010 (as of December 2009) Bevölkerungsentwicklung 
und Flächen der kreisfreien Städte, Landkreise und Gemeinden im Land Brandenburg 2009 
(Report Oct. 10, 2010) und Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg, Ämter Verzeichnis Gebietsstand 
01.03.2009, both at www.statistik-berlin-brandenburg.de.
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The Land government, however, considered the process to be proceeding 
too slowly. This was particularly due to the fact that small municipalities 
continued to be on the edge of survival: the only who could cope with the 
lack of resources were those joined in the Ämter (Berg 2002: 25 note 33). It 
is also worth noticing that in this phase of mergers-in-progress24, the chosen 
formats were not those where the Ämter had to be dismantled or substituted. 
Instead, the favourite forms of merging were those within the Ämter or the 
incorporation into larger cities (Berg and Möller 1997: 10). A more effective 
action was therefore needed.
Toward the end of the decade another attempt to accelerate the volunteer 
territorial reform was pursued by the Land: in 1998/1999 an inquiry-
commission prepared a territorial policy reform which went in the direction 
of bigger administrative and political units – but these proposals proved 
again unsuccessful. Nevertheless, a new wave of municipal reforms rose and 
invested the Eastern as well as some of the Western Länder, pushing for a 
re-drawing of the local authorities borders, probably as a reaction to the 
disillusion about the early 90s territorial reforms (Wollmann 2010a: 274-275) 
25.
It was however only with the 1999 elections and the new Land government26 
that territorial reform in Brandenburg effectively emerged as a priority. 
Eventually in 2001 the Land approved the law on municipal restructuring 
and empowerment27. Thanks to this act, a real territorial institutional policy 
was finally put in place: it was an encompassing local authorities’ reform with 
the aim of creating bigger municipalities and Ämter, and to improve their 
management, financial and public service-providing capacity.
24  This was also the period when the effects of the Kreisreform (district reform), which took place 
in 1991-1993 and was one of the most successful in the Eastern Länder (Büchner and Franzke 
2001: 9-10), also started to be tangible at the municipal level. The districts reform ended with the 
total number of districts (Kreise) reduced from 38 to 14. The reform (Gesetz zur Neugliederung 
der Kreise und kreisfreien Städte of Dec. 16, 1992) entered in full force with the municipal election 
of Dec. 5, 1993. 
25  Some analysts place the beginning of this new reform wave in Brandenburg already in 1996, 
after the municipal administrative reform in 1992, the district reform in 1993 and the approval of 
the functional reform law in 1994 (Berg and Möller 1997: 3). 
26  In these regional elections a Grand coalition – that is, formed by the two main parties, the 
Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Socialdemocrats (SPD) – entered in power.
27  In July 2000 the Land drafted the guidelines (Leitlinien für die Entwicklung der 
Gemeindestruktur im Land Brandenburg) and in February 2001 the Land Parliament approved the 
municipal structure’s reform law (Gesetz zur Reform der Gemeindestruktur und zur Stärkung der 
Verwaltungskraft im Land Brandenburg of March 15, 2001).
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The 2001 law also revealed a model-change in the Brandenburg approach: 
from a participation-oriented approach to a more efficiency-oriented one, from 
a balance-seeking attitude to a competition-fostering one. In other words, the 
Brandenburg way began to be abandoned (Berg 2002: 23). Of course in this 
phase mergers among municipalities, aimed at creating bigger local authorities, 
were warmly fostered by the Land government and financial support was given 
to those municipalities which decide to merge (Kuhlmann 2004: 21)28. The 
law also reduced the options about the kind of Ämter municipalities could 
form to only one format, allowing just the creation of a self-administrating 
Amt29 (Müller 2006: 10); it also increased the Ämter minimun size to 5,000 
inhabitants and membership to 3 municipalities, as well as enhanced the 
transformation of Ämter into Amt-free cities30 (Künzel 2003: 99).
In summary, the 2001 law established the guidelines to which the existing 
Ämter and municipalities should adapt and accordingly reduce their own 
number. Local authorities thus had the possibility to freely revising their 
borders and existence until spring 200231. As shown in table 10, since 2001, 
as a consequence of this reform, free mergers dramatically increased: 172 
occurred in 2001, 108 in 2002 and more than 80 in 2003, when the total 
number of fusions reached 491 and the total number of municipalities in a 
decade dropped by more than a half (from 1,813 in 1993 to 886 in 2003, see 
again table 9). 
At the end of this «volunteer phase» (Freiwilligkeitsphase), the Land 
government and parliament should have validated these solutions and, in case 
28  Funds for territorial modification were to be found in the municipal (§ 16 GFG – Ausgleichsfonds) 
as well as in the Land budget. The fusion premium should be conferred within March 15 of the 
year following the merging (www.mi.brandenburg.de/sixcms/detail.php?id=24463, last access 
Nov. 3, 2010).
29  In 1991 municipalities had the option of choosing among three kinds of Ämter: a) with self-
administration, b) with administration in one of the member municipalities, c) with administration 
in an Amt-free municipality (among others, Duve 2005: 29ff.).
30  The Amt-free municipalities (or cities), often called unity (or integrated) municipalities 
(Einheitsgemeinden), are the option few Länder (among those Saxony in the East, North Rhein-
Westfalia and Hesse in the West) chose in the first stage of the territorial reforms. They are 
currently considered the best solution – regarding size, organization and competences – for local 
authorities in terms of efficacy, efficiency and management capacities (Hesse and Götz 2003: 606; 
Duve 2005: 36, 38). 
31  See Ministerium des Innern, Begründung zu den Leitlinien der Landesregierung für die 
Entwicklung der Gemeindestruktur im Land Brandenburg (July 11, 2000, page 23) (www.
mi.brandenburg.de/sixcms/detail.php?id=12566, last access Nov. 3, 2010).
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of un-accomplishing authorities, quickly intervening by law within 200332. In 
October 2002 about 250 municipalities were still under 250 inhabitants. The 
Land parliament, after consulting and auditing the involved municipalities and 
citizens, approved in March 2003 six laws for merging them33, concluding 
with these acts the territorial institutional reform, which entered into force 
with the local elections on October 26, 2003. The top-down compulsory 
mergers came therefore as an ultimate policy instrument. For example, in 44 
cases the Land Brandenburg imposed an Amt where municipalities had found 
no solution for joining together (Müller 2006: 10), 237 municipalities were 
merged in bigger ones and 91 small municipalities were integrated in 19 new 
ones (Duve 2005: 35). 
In practice, with the Fall 2003 acts a more effective reform replaced the 
soft reform of the previous decade (Wollmann 2008: 258) in Brandenburg. 
Also the number of Ämter dropped to about one third (see table 10 again) and 
the mergers continued, although no longer financially supported, along with an 
increase of Amt-free municipalities. A few years after the 2003 acts, the total 
number of municipalities had stabilized around 420 (see again tables 9 and 10), 
with 33% of them which «have been turned into integrated … municipalities 
(Einheitsgemeinden), as compared to 2% prior to the reform. While the dual 
structure continues to exist, the percentage of municipalities belonging to 
intercommunal bodies has dropped from 95% to 66%» (Wollmann 2010a: 
274).
The implementation of this reform however was extremely controversial 
(Mier 2003: 24ff.): many municipalities appealed to the Land court34 and 
additionally public opinion was not always, and continues to be35, quite 
sceptical about the reform’s effects as far as proximity, citizen participation 
and local democracy are concerned.
In the following mandate (2004-2009) the Grand Coalition Land government 
was confirmed but no further reform was planned or started. Nevertheless, the 
32  KWI Newsletter Gebietsreformen n. 3, 2002, page 2, and n. 4, 2003, page 2, both available 
at www.uni-potsdam.de/u/kwi/publikationen/newsletter_gebietsreform.html (last access Nov. 3, 
2010).
33  See Brandeburgische Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung www.politische-bildung-
brandenburg.de/kommunal/hintergrund/kommunalpolitik_wk7.htm (last access Nov. 3, 2010).
34  KWI Newsletter Gebietsreformen n. 3, 2002, pp. 2-3; Mier 2003: 28; Kommunalpolitisches 
Forum Land Brandenburg (2003).
35  See for example page www.rbb-online.de/klartext/beitrag/2009/brandenburg_
demokratiedefizit.html (last access July 21, 2009).
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debate about the need for additional changes to the Brandenburg two-level 
model36 (Bogumil 2007: 5) and to territorial dimensions and competencies of 
local authorities – especially of Ämter – did not cease 
In the 2009 regional elections a new government (SPD-Left Party) 
entered into power. In its first years the Land government has not directly re-
vitalized the territorial reform issue, but it nonetheless has brought the smaller 
municipalities’ problem to surface again. With a funding program started in 
201037 and aimed at empowering small municipalities, particularly those in 
rural areas, through fostering their networks and cooperation in order to cope 
with the basic services delivering, the Land has decided to insist once again 
on the need for inter-municipal networks and cooperations. It is not by chance 
that it is compulsory for the applying authorities to already be part of an inter-
municipal network in order to receive financing. Therefore, even if no explicit 
reform or merging is in the air, Land Brandenburg’s most recent message to its 
municipalities is quite clear: be part of a network or you won’t receive funding 
(that is, also, you won’t survive).
From a Liberal to a Purposeful Approach to IMC
After this analysis, what can be said on the territorial institutional reforms and 
IMCs in Brandenburg throughout the years?
As in Emilia-Romagna, in Brandenburg also some stages can be singled 
out: a first phase (1990-1993), a second one (1993-2001), a third phase started 
in 2001 and concluded in 2004, and a fourth, current stage (2004-present).
The first phase (1990-1993) represents the «very beginning of IMC» in 
Brandenburg, coinciding with the re-establishment of its territorial authorities 
at all levels. This period saw Brandenburg avoiding any coercive strategy with 
respect to territorial policy at large and IMC in particular. This approach was 
actually shared with the other Eastern Länder: none of them, opted for a radical 
solution of forced merging, while instead all of them moved towards different 
forms of (mainly administrative) inter-municipal cooperations. The second 
stage (1993-2001) can be defined as an «inter-municipal mediation». Marked 
by a tepid consensus of the municipalities towards the merging proposals, and 
by reform attempts by the Land towards a territorial rationalization, these years 
passed with the consolidation of Ämter as the IMC response to the pressures 
36  The two-levels model means that there is no intermediate territorial authority between Land 
and districts.
37  For details on the program see: www.mil.brandenburg.de/cms/detail.php/bb1.c.219038.de 
(last access: Nov. 4, 2010). The first round for applications closed in September 2010. Around 1,6 
million Euros were put aside by Land Brandenburg and Federal State for this program in 2010.
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and constraints challenging the local authorities. However, neither courageous 
IMC innovations nor an effective territorial reform actually took place. The 
third phase (2001-2004) coincides with the «real territorial reform», which 
started with the 2001 law and ended with the six laws on compulsory mergers 
of municipalities approved at the end of 2003. In this stage, Land Brandenburg 
moved from a soft to a more coercive approach towards IMC and territorial 
institutional policy. Ämter are still largely in use and are still the lifesaver for 
most small municipalities, but since 2001 the Land plainly started pointing 
at greater territorial, institutional and functional rationalization. Indeed a 
reduction in the number of municipalities and Ämter, and a parallel increase of 
Amt-free municipalities (Einheitsgemeinden) have been achieved. After these 
reform years, no other step in this policy field has been taken by the Land 
government, so that since 2004 the current phase is characterised by balance 
and awaiting. Nonetheless, with the new term 2009-2013, the Land seems to 
have regained interest in this issue and the 2010 funding program for smaller 
municipalities may represent a re-wakening for IMC initiatives.
Apart from the above described phases, it can be stated that the Land 
Brandenburg attitude towards IMCs has always been quite moderate and 
mostly reactive to environmental conditions. Although not differently from 
most Eastern Länder, Brandenburg saw IMC more as a compromise solution 
that allowed it to avoid the coercive measures of territorial reform, more than 
as a strategic institutional instrument for territorial development. The (mostly 
administrative) inter-municipal cooperation through the Ämter was therefore a 
compromise between the optimal territorial size for public service delivering 
and costs cuts, and the preservation of municipal identity and autonomy. 
Nevertheless, the most recent years since the 2001-2003 reform have shown a 
shift in the Land approach. IMC began to be conceived no longer as a second-
best option, but as an important, resolutive and strategic tool. The 2001 
law was in fact much less permissive and voluntary-based, but rather much 
more authoritative and steering than before with respect to the IMC options. 
Therefore the Land approach changed from being quite «liberal» (in the sense 
of leaving municipalities free of merging or not, and how) to be definitely 
«purposeful» (by assessing the goal of municipalities’ and Ämter’s reduction, 
by limiting the options and the time span for merging, and by foreseeing an 
authoritative intervention at the end of the voluntary phase).
As will be seen further on, despite the fact that this approach was partially 
different from the one used by Emilia-Romagna, the government/governance 
relations can be singled out in the two regions, also reveal some common 
features. 
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8  Some Comparisons and Findings
The analysis conducted so far already allows us to draw some conclusions. 
Although differences due to the respective national (regio-unitary vs. 
federal) architecture, both Italy and Germany, as well as Emilia-Romagna 
and Brandenburg, show some features – territorial development, municipal 
settlement and size – which can be reasonably compared. And in fact in both 
cases, not by chance, inter-municipal cooperation has been at the core of 
territorial policies in the last decades, both as a policy sub-area in itself, and 
as a policy instrument. Moreover, in both regions the analyzed IMC forms 
display similar characteristics. Municipal Unions in Emilia-Romagna and 
Ämter in Brandenburg are formal, highly institutionalized inter-municipal 
cooperations. The scope and range of their functions and of the competences 
transferred by the cooperating municipalities, as well as their extension38, can 
be very different, but both have the same core principle as their basis: they 
are second-level public authorities, indirectly elected and accountable, whose 
competences are transferred to them by member municipalities or by regional/
Land laws39. 
Bearing this in mind, let us see now which findings can be singled out by 
comparing some significant aspects about IMCs and territorial institutional 
policy in Emilia-Romagna and Brandenburg. Three specific issues will be 
discussed in the following.
8.1 Territorial Institutional Policy and its Implementation
The first issue (and finding) is a different approach detected in the two regions 
towards the policy itself as well as towards its implementation. Concerning 
IMC and territorial institutional policy at large, Emilia-Romagna has often 
anticipated the national trends, innovated the IMC legislation and pioneered 
most of the Italian regions. Its approach in this policy field can therefore 
38  Nevertheless, as showed in table 5, size is not extremely different due that an average of 5.1 
municipalities are members of the 53 Brandenburg Ämter, while an average of 5.2 municipalities 
participates to the 31 MUs in Emilia-Romagna.
39  As previously exposed, and according to the subdivision of local administration proposed 
by Hesse and Götz (2003: 593), the Ämter are lower municipal administration (untere 
Kommunalverwaltung) whose competencies can vary, according to which tasks are transferred by 
the municipalities (Berg and Möller 1996: 5-7). Accordingly, the MUs receive a varying number 
of tasks and functions through the agreements between their member municipalities (Baldini et 
al. 2009: 115ff.).
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be defined as «pioneer and proactive». On the other side, Brandenburg has 
behaved more prudently, following the main stream and with interventions 
mostly drawn by no longer sustainable municipal assets: its approach has thus 
been «cautious and reactive». Concerning implementation, instead, the in-
depth analysis let us single out a «permissive and assertive» attitude in Emilia-
Romagna, where the region – as detailed before – left the municipalities free 
to choose the preferred IMC form, but, at the same time, within rich guidelines 
which set the path in a quite well-defined and almost pre-determined way. On 
the other side, Brandenburg moved from a «liberal» attitude in the voluntary 
phase, trying not to force municipalities in any way towards fusions and 
mergers but only proposing these options to them, to a «purposeful» attitude 
in the authoritative phase, when it became clear that the voluntary phase had 
produced no adequate result for territorial rationalization and management, 
and that many municipalities’ survival was in utmost danger.
8.2 Regions Towards Local Authorities in IMCs 
The second issue concerns the approach the two regions have had towards the 
municipalities and territories involved in the IMCs and territorial reforms. In 
both cases it must be noted that the regions preferred their municipalities to be 
joined in IMC experiences rather than fused in bigger cities. Both regions were 
aware of the opposition (small) municipalities would have led against, and 
tried therefore to avoid it. Emilia-Romagna by inventing the IAs, Brandenburg 
by disregarding the fusion option and introducing the Ämter at the beginning, 
and both by leaving the municipalities more or less free to choose the merging 
option they preferred. 
Despite this analogy in preferring IMCs to mergers – as well as in 
favouring free choice to coercion – in both cases most successes in territorial 
policy came when the two regions used their powers upon municipalities, 
“sweetened” or not, with the willingness’ options. Emilia-Romagna renounced 
to its substitutive power towards local authorities and even softened the 
IMC compulsoriness when national laws were instead conceding regions 
more coercive powers towards municipalities. But it also proposed limited 
options and showed clear-cut preferences, also by using financial instruments 
to support these preferences: the result was a boosting of inter-municipal 
cooperations. In Brandenburg some opportunity reasons – that is, as said, 
leaving the newly re-installed local authorities free from an over-ranked power 
– pushed the Land towards a mild option at the beginning, which brought 
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to a modest success in terms of numbers, although to good inter-municipal 
cooperation’s quality through the Ämter. Later Brandenburg, in its turn, 
empowered itself towards the municipalities after the functional reform (Berg 
2002: 18), imposed a clearer route in its territorial policy by using its power 
upon municipalities; and in this way some improvements – both in numbers 
and in territorial rationalization – came. 
Summing up, in both cases, IMCs (in the forms of MUs and Ämter) in 
the 90s were a direct expression of the regional/Land will of reducing the 
number of municipalities and diminishing their difficulties to cope with the 
encompassing lack of resources. But they were also a compromise to avoid 
obliged fusions and consequent identity losses for municipalities.
Nowadays, almost 20 years later, both regions no longer conceive IMCs 
as a way to avoid mergers and preserve municipal identities, but as an 
autonomous institutional tool, apt to create bigger (i.e. «optimal») territorial 
units, provided with more functions, competences and abilities, and capable 
of attaining better territorial management and development, as well as to cope 
with the challenges pressing the local authorities. 
8.3 Policy Procedures and Governance
A third issue concerns the procedures Emilia-Romagna and Brandenburg 
adopted to implement their territorial institutional policies. In other words, if 
and how these regions used, or allowed, governance dynamics in this policy 
field. Without going into an in-depth governance analysis, it can nevertheless 
be claimed that both regions willingly used governance instruments and 
procedures. 
Emilia-Romagna always paid particular attention to ensuring an effective 
local authorities’ involvement in the ascendant phase of territorial policy and 
in its decision-making processes, being the regional laws 3/1999 and 11/2001 
good examples for that. This region also gathers yearly the regional committee 
for the IMC development (named Conference of the IMC presidents), which 
is the main instrument for negotiation and governance in territorial and IMC 
issues. This turned out to be a very useful and important instrument if it is 
true, as a regional high-ranked civil servant declared40, that thanks to this 
conference the regional laws concerning IMCs have been largely consensual, 
and positive agreements have been always reached among the parts. 
40  Interview to an Emilia-Romagna high-ranked civil servant – Unit for institutional and 
legislative affairs. See Baldini et al. (2009: 59).
Local Government and Inter-Municipal Cooperation in Italy and Germany
PIFO Occasional Papers No. 12/2011 | Page 40
In Brandenburg the governance approach is even more emphasized. 
Governance aspects, network-based consultations, deliberation and decision-
making processes are in Germany particularly cared for (Berg and Möller 
1997: 4). As seen in paragraph 6, willingness and voluntary choices have been 
the basis of the Brandenburg way: consultations with involved municipalities 
have been conducted in each phase, as testified by the procedure the Land 
chose to adopt before closing the reform in 2003. Of course, the more open the 
process and the more actors involved, the greater the risks of policy-making 
stagnation, obstruction or hampering. Part of the different (slower) timings and 
(more modest) level of success of Brandenburg in respect to Emilia-Romagna 
in territorial policy may perhaps also be explained with this highly-inclusive 
networked procedure. 
Finally, a last remark about the incentives available to the actors involved 
in the governance processes must be done. Both regions used financial 
incentives to attract their counterparts (municipalities) towards their preferred 
IMCs or territorial rationalization’s solutions41. Emilia-Romagna, for instance, 
was convinced that «only adequate financial incentives could guarantee the 
effective creation of IMCs» (Regione Emilia-Romagna 2003: 6), and in fact 
extraordinary and ordinary incentives have been settled by this region (Baldini 
et al. 2009: 59ff.). Brandenburg, as well, budgeted financial incentives 
for those municipalities that chose to merge. In other words, in both cases 
the municipalities were induced by material incentives to opt for top-down 
solutions, more than to elaborate their own solutions.
9  Emilia-Romagna and Brandenburg between Government  
 and Governance in Territorial Institutional Policy 
If all the above holds true, which conclusions can be attempted upon 
government/governance relations in this policy field for the two regions?
 Some elements allow us to claim that Emilia-Romagna optimized a 
«satisfactory deliberate equilibrium» between steering and horizontal 
bargaining, i.e between government and governance features. If in fact it must 
be recognized that – for instance with the 1999 regional law – Emilia-Romagna 
gave up some authoritative tools, it must be also acknowledged that all of its 
41  Financial incentives offered to municipalities have usually been quite modest in both regions. 
In any case, despite their entity, municipal finances in Italy and Germany, as well as throughout 
Europe, have been so constrained and precarious since the 80s that also minimal aids from the end 
of the regions are most welcome and eagerly accepted. 
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interventions have been guided by a clear vision of the preferred territorial 
institutional options and solutions. Alternatives were not impeded but neither 
fostered as well. The IMC boom in Emilia-Romagna coincided both with a 
formal weakening of authoritarian methods and the parallel introduction of 
bargaining and consultative relations (with municipalities, as well as with 
socio-economic actors); but, even more, with a de facto empowering of the 
region and with a fine-tuning of its institutional preferences.
Emilia-Romagna has always cared an effective involvement of local 
authorities in public policies and decision-making processes. To give an 
example, a regional report stated that the 11/2001 regional law’s philosophy 
was to reach the local authorities’ dimensional adaptation without using 
authoritative instruments (Regione Emilia-Romagna 2003: 6). Nevertheless, 
as said, this region often used directives and “preferred guidelines” towards 
its municipalities and IMCs. This proves both its deep consideration of local 
authorities and an assertive approach in territorial policy and management. 
Brandenburg instead reached a more «provisional unexpected equilibrium». 
This region found a balance between governance (as a free arena for 
municipalities to consult and be consulted and as a discussion arena on reform 
implementation) and government (by imposing its own policy view by law 
from 2001 on), but this result has been more contingency-led rather than 
planned. Therefore it has been more unintentional than calculated. In the first 
years what we defined «liberal approach», left the local authorities to freely 
choose their way towards a territorial re-asset, by means of open deliberation 
and bargaining. Later, instead, municipalities’ consulting and auditing coupled 
with Land financial and legislative support to the preferred IMC option (i.e. 
reduction in number of both Ämter and municipalities), and marked the most 
recent Brandenburg approach to IMC and territorial institutional policy. As if, 
in a sort of continuum, the first two stages (1990-1993 and 1993-2001) were 
to be placed nearer to the governance pole, while the third (2001-2004) and 
the fourth phase (2004-present) to the government extremity. But, as said, this 
shift took place in quite an abrupt and only-to-a-small-extent planned way. 
In sum, it can be stated that both regions reached a sort of equilibrium in 
territorial institutional policy between governance and government, although 
evidences let us suppose that in Emilia-Romagna this equilibrium could be 
more stable and intended, while in Brandenburg it could be more provisional 
and likely to further change in time either towards the governance- or the 
government-pole.
More and more, in many Western countries, the municipal arenas are 
characterized by governance features, especially in the form of networks of 
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actors and institutions with specific tasks and goals (Wollmann 2008: 266). 
In territorial institutional policy, as well as in inter-municipal cooperation, 
governance is an extremely used concept. The same regional/Land authorities 
often use this term to endorse their actions (Baldini et al. 2009: 8-9; Bieker et 
al. 2004: 41-42), particularly their negotiating procedures and instruments such 
as municipalities’ auditing, local actors forums, etc. But, as explained above, 
things are not exactly – or simply – like this. Both because as an institutional 
policy, territorial policy implies a peculiarly strong role of government, which 
impedes fully governance-based dynamics; and because empirical evidence 
thus far shows that it is rather a balance and a complementariness between 
governance and government to be at work in this policy field, more than a 
prevalence of one side or the other.
Regional governments, in fact, although indirectly and despite the 
governance procedures or arenas they allow, put paths and favourite options 
forward. They offer opportunities and deliberation spaces but also show 
clear-cut preferences in a sort of «constrained track», which in practice force 
municipalities to prefer one option rather than others, also thanks to financial 
and normative incentives. In order to promote – and secure – effective 
inter-municipal cooperations, voluntary instruments alone are not enough 
(Hesse and Götz 2006: 131) or, in other words, governance instrument alone 
cannot provide satisfactory solutions in this policy field. Thus hierarchy and 
government’s steering re-enter the game.
To conclude this analysis, let alone the need for further research in the field, 
what Mayntz and Scharpf (1995) stated more than a decade ago, when the 
debate about governance flourished – then reported again in Mayntz (2003: 31-
32) – seems to be still dramatically updated: «hierarchical control and societal 
self-regulation are not mutually exclusive. (…) They are different ordering 
principles which are often combined, and their combination, self-regulation 
‘in the shadow of hierarchy’, can be more effective than either of the ‘pure’ 
governance forms». 
In the field of territorial institutional policy – and in the specific case of 
inter-municipal cooperations in the two case studies – this sounds to be even 
more accurate, as will be stressed again in the next paragraph.
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10 Conclusion: The Role of Meso-Governments in   
 Territorial Institutional Policy in Italy and Germany
It must in fact be restated, that the governance arena in territorial institutional 
policy is quite peculiar. Due to the fact that territorial policy can be reasonably 
considered an institutional policy – as considered in this essay and argued in 
paragraph 3 – a higher role of hierarchy than in other policy fields must be 
taken into account. It is the responsibility of the institution (here the region 
or Land) to decide if and how governance networks should be allowed and if 
horizontal relations, and different public/private, institutional/socio-economic 
actors should be included in the policy-making. In this framework, both 
regions analyzed here have been quite open, allowing negotiations, audits, and 
bargaining with the municipalities. They have permitted horizontal forums and 
networks established by the municipalities with other actors (mainly local trade 
unions, enterprises, employers’ associations, citizens’ associations) as well, in 
order to discuss the territorial options at stake. But as emerged all through the 
analysis conducted thus far, the government aspect has always remained the 
determining one. 
Therefore it can be argued that the region/Land is, de facto, the principal 
actor in this policy field. Partly, as said, because of the policy’s nature, which 
renders this pre-eminence unavoidable. Partly because of Emilia-Romagna 
and Brandenburg themselves, which sooner or later chose to use their powers 
and to impose their top-down decisions, by shutting down all governance 
dynamics. 
As far as the regions and territorial institutional policy are concerned, 
another aspect is worth recalling: Emilia-Romagna and Brandenburg – and in 
general Italian regions and German Länder – can afford two different starting 
points, once again to be imputed to the institutional asset of the two countries. 
If in Italy regions had to “conquer” or to be entitled by the state with powers 
in the field of territorial policy and in the management of IMCs, in Germany 
the Länder have this policy already among their exclusive competencies. In 
time, Italian regions have progressively been empowered with legislative 
competences and powers in the matter of IMCs, as well as with the authority 
to intervene when municipalities do not comply with their guidelines. In 
Germany those powers are guaranteed by the Basic Law. Territorial and 
municipal policies belong to the exclusive competences of the Länder, whose 
position towards the municipalities was in a way, from the beginning, more 
clearly stated than in the Italian case. Despite this, territorial – and particularly 
municipal identities – are in Germany extremely strong, so that the coercive 
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powers of the Land governments may be paradoxically more reluctantly used 
than in Italy.  
Nonetheless in both cases an empowerment of meso-governments, 
although in different measures, can be detected. In Italy, already with the 
142/1990 law, regions were recognized as «propeller and coordination center 
in the whole local autonomies’ system» (Filippini and Maglieri 2008: 343)42. 
Years later, with the 59/1997 law and with the decree 112/1998, regions were 
entitled to choose the so-called «optimal levels» (ATOs) or «optimal context 
for associated managing of functions and public services» (Vandelli 2005: 
28). Since then in the Italian legislation, a central role was therefore devoted 
to the meso-governments, entitled to foster the joint management of services 
in small municipalities through the allocation of these ATOs. Within the 
ATOs and in the framework of regional laws, municipalities should choose 
their own association and cooperation forms; if no decision has been made 
by the involved municipalities within a certain period of time, it becomes the 
precise task of the region to intervene (ibidem). The 265/1999 law further 
stressed these points, by conferring on the regions the power to enhance and 
promote IMC as well as the related incentives, particularly if oriented towards 
aggregation and fusion of small municipalities. This law, as already noted 
when dealing with the Emilia-Romagna case, was a real turning point for 
local authorities and IMCs in Italy. Finally the Constitutional revision in 2001 
ultimately «converted the regions in the pivotal centre of the local governance» 
(Baldini et al. 2009: 52). The new constitutional asset «progressively opened 
up a wider and wider space to the regional legislative power concerning the 
ruling of cooperation forms» (Filippini and Maglieri 2008: 370). It can be 
thus stated that in time, Italian regions conquered an effective central role in 
territorial institutional policy. If it is true that more horizontal and governance 
features have been introduced after the 2001 constitutional revision, it is 
also true that a parallel empowerment of the regional meso-governments 
has doubtless taken place, so that they nowadays are the real engine of inter-
municipal cooperation.
Summing up, it can be claimed that currently Italian regions have attained 
quite a strong position in territorial institutional policy, along with an effective 
empowerment of coercion power, so that they are now comparable in this 
policy field to the German Länder and their constitutionally guaranteed 
powers.
42  This status was also later established by the Constitutional Court decision n. 343/1991.
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In Germany, as said, the starting point was different and the role and 
competences of the Länder were guaranteed by the Basic Law. Nevertheless, 
the tension between the meso-government level and local authorities has never 
been absent. And also in the German case the role of the meso-governments has 
been empowered in time, although they already had a strong position. After the 
functional and territorial reforms in the second half of the 90s, in fact, the real 
scope of these reforms rested unattended and the effect was instead a further 
growing of the Land weight towards the municipalities (Berg 2002: 18). At the 
same time it is also true that the attention paid to the governance aspects and 
to the network-based consultation, deliberation and decision-making processes 
in Germany has always been extremely strong (Berg and Möller 1997: 4) – as 
testified to by the case of Land Brandenburg – and continued to be so despite 
the Länder empowerment.
Hence, in both Italian regions and German Länder, the balance of power 
between freedom, choice and inclusive democracy, on the one hand, and 
top-down decision and coercion, on the other hand, still remains uncertain: 
in a broader sense this brings us back again to the government/governance 
equilibrium-to-be. 
In this respect a question about the role of meso-governments and their 
limits may have arisen: how far should the coercive power of regional 
authorities affect municipalities (Hesse and Götz 2006: 121 ff.)? If considering 
in fact that in the whole of Europe, and thus also in Italy and Germany, IMC’s 
boom coincided with the empowerment of local executives through the direct 
election of the mayors, the issue appears to be particularly intriguing.  The 
“new” majors are reinforced and visible heads of municipalities, which had 
to face mounting challenges for local authorities and also for IMC forms. 
That means that local actors are directly elected and thus legitimated and 
responsible, and can therefore be more reluctant to accept top-down decisions, 
bringing again to the surface potential tension between local authorities 
and over-ranked regional institutions. All these factors render the territorial 
institutional policy an evolving field where the question of a balance, or 
coexistence, between hierarchical governmental features and horizontal 
governance elements turns out to be still debated and on the move.
Finally, trying to draw a last conclusion on this topic, it can be stated that in 
general terms territorial institutional policy – and in particular when speaking 
about IMC – is exactly the case where state, regional and institutional actors at 
large «are a very special and privileged kind of participant; they retain crucial 
means of intervention, and this holds even where decision making has been 
devolved to institutions of societal self-government. In particular, the state 
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retains the right of legal ratification, the right to authoritative decision where 
societal actors do not come to a conclusion (…), and the right to intervene 
by legislative or executive action where a self-governing system (…) fails to 
meet regulatory expectations» (Mayntz 1999: 9-10 and 2003: 31-32). In other 
words, it can be argued that the meso-government level is recognized as a 
key-player in regional governance43; as well, in many policy fields including 
territorial institutional policy, hierarchy is considered predominant in respect 
to any governance form (Auel 2006).
And more than that, it can be argued that meso-governments, both in 
Italy and in Germany, despite their different starting points, have definitively 
become the leading level in territorial institutional policy.
43  For accuracy’s sake it must be accounted that by «regional governance» in Germany it is 
often meant the governance dynamics (non-hierachical, bringing governmental and societal 
actors together, having both formal and informal levels, being characterised by competitive and 
cooperative inter-actor relations, inter-organizational, private/public partnership-oriented, etc.) 
(Benz 2001) applied to sub-Länder level and concerning a certain policy field (Benz and Fürst 
2003, Benz and Meincke 2006, Benz and Papadopoulos 2006). In this essay, IMC and territorial 
institutional policy is instead a policy field analysed at the regional/Land level, where regional 
governance dynamics are thus both among Land/region and municipalities, and among Land/
region, municipalities, and other local socio-economic and institutional actors (mostly involved 
by municipalities).
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Appendix
List of Municipal Unions, Mountain Communities, and Intermunicipal 
Associations in Emilia-Romagna (2010)
Municipal Unions 
1. Unione Terre di Pianura
2. Unione dei Comuni Terre e Fiumi
3. Unione Acquacheta Romagna Toscana
4. Unione Colline Matildiche
5. Unione Bassa Reggiana
6. Unione Pedemontana Parmense
7. Unione Alto Appennino Reggiano
8. Unione Civica Terre del Po
9. Unione Comuni Pianura Reggiana
10. Unione dei Comuni del Rubicone
11. Unione Comuni della Bassa Romagna
12. Unione dei Comuni Modenesi area nord
13. Unione del Sorbara
14. Unione Bassa est Parmense
15. Unione Terre Verdiane
16. Unione Tresinaro Secchia
17. Unione Val d´Enza
18. Unione Val Nure
19. Unione Bassa Val Trebbia e Val Luretta
20. Unione della Valconca
21. Unione Terre d´Argine
22. Unione Terre di Castelli
23. Unione Reno Galliera
24. Unione dei Comuni di Brisighella, Casola Valsenio, Riolo Terme
25. Unione Val Tidone
26. Unione dei Comuni Valli Savena Idice
27. Unione Comuni montani Valli del Dolo, Dragone e Secchia
28. Unione Valle del Samoggia
29. Unione Valle del Marecchia
30. Unione Terra di Mezzo
31. Nuovo Circondario Imolese
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Mountain Communities
1. Nuova Comunità montana Appennino Piacentino
2. Nuova Comunità montana Valli del Taro e Ceno
3. Nuova Comunità montana Appennino Bolognese
4. Nuova Comunità montana Nure e Arda
5. Nuova Comunità montana Parma est
6. Nuova Comunità montana del Frignano
7. Nuova Comunità montana Appennino cesenate
8. Nuova Comunità montana Appennino Forlivese
9. Nuova Comunità montana Appennino Reggiano
10. Comunità montana Alta Valmarecchia
Intermunicipal Associations
1. Associazione intercomunale Val d´Arda
2. Associazione intercomunale del Distretto Ceramico
3. Associazione intercomunale Cinque Castelli
4. Associazione intercomunale Pianura Forlivese
5. Associazione intercomunale Valle dell´Idice
6. Associazione intercomunale Terre d´Acqua
7. Associazione intercomunale Argenta e Portomaggiore
8. Associazione intercomunale Basso Ferrarese
9. Associazione intercomunale Alto Ferrarese
10. Associazione intercomunale tra i Comuni di Ferrara, Masi Torello, 
Voghiera
11. Associazione intercomunale Cesena, Gambettola,  
Longiano,Montiano
List of Ämter in Brandenburg (2010)
1. Amt Altdöbern  
2. Amt Bad Wilsnack/Weisen  
3. Amt Barnim-Oderbruch  
4. Amt Beetzsee  
5. Amt Biesenthal-Barnim  
6. Amt Brieskow-Finkenheerd  
7. Amt Britz-Chorin-Oderberg  
8. Amt Brück  
9. Amt Brüssow (Uckermark)  
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10. Amt Burg (Spreewald)  
11. Amt Dahme/Mark  
12. Amt Döbern-Land  
13. Amt Elsterland  
14. Amt Falkenberg-Höhe  
15. Amt Friesack  
16. Amt Gartz (Oder)  
17. Amt Gerswalde  
18. Amt Golßener Land  
19. Amt Golzow  
20. Amt Gramzow  
21. Amt Gransee und Gemeinden  
22. Amt Joachimsthal (Schorfheide)  
23. Amt Kleine Elster (Niederlausitz)  
24. Amt Lebus  
25. Amt Lenzen-Elbtalaue  
26. Amt Lieberose/Oberspreewald  
27. Amt Lindow (Mark)  
28. Amt Märkische Schweiz  
29. Amt Meyenburg  
30. Amt Nennhausen  
31. Amt Neuhardenberg  
32. Amt Neustadt (Dosse)  
33. Amt Neuzelle  
34. Amt Niemegk  
35. Amt Odervorland  
36. Amt Oder-Welse  
37. Amt Ortrand  
38. Amt Peitz  
39. Amt Plessa  
40. Amt Putlitz-Berge  
41. Amt Rhinow  
42. Amt Ruhland  
43. Amt Scharmützelsee  
44. Amt Schenkenländchen  
45. Amt Schlaubetal  
46. Amt Schlieben  
47. Amt Schradenland  
48. Amt Seelow-Land  
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49. Amt Spreenhagen  
50. Amt Temnitz  
51. Amt Unterspreewald  
52. Amt Wusterwitz  
53. Amt Ziesar  
List of Zweckverbände in Brandenburg (2010)
1. Abfallentsorgungsverband ‘Schwarze Elster’
2. Abwasserentsorgungsverband Niemegk
3. Abwasserverband Gerswalde
4. Abwasserzweckverband Cottbus Süd-Ost
5. Abwasserzweckverband Teupitzsee Amt Schenkenländchen
6. Abwasserzweckverband Planetal
7. Brandenburgische Kommunalakademie
8. EDV-Zweckverband Prignitz
9. Gubener Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband (GWAZ)
10. Herzberger Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband
11. Kommunaler Abfallentsorgungsverband ‘Niederlausitz’
12. Märkischer Abwasser- und Wasserzweckverband
13. Niederbarnimer Wasser- und Abwassserzweckverband
14. Nord-Uckermärkischer Wasser- und Abwasserverband
15. Planungsverband Flugplatz Lönnewitz
16. Schulverband Burg
17. Schulverband Dolgelin/ Alt Zeschdorf
18. Schulverband Heckelberg
19. Schulverband Lenzen (Elbe)
20. Spremberger Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband
21. Südbrandenburgischer Abfallzweckverband (SBAZV)
22. Trink- und Abwasserverband Lindow-Gransee
23. Trink- und Abwasserzweckverband Burg (Spreewald)
24. Trink- und Abwasserzweckverband ‘Glien’
25. Trink- und Abwasserzweckverband Crinitz und Umgebung
26. Trink- und Abwasserverband Oderbruch/Barnim
27. Trink- und Abwasserverband ‘Freies Havelbruch’
28. Trink- und Abwasserverband - Hammerstrom/Malxe - Peitz
29. Trink- und Abwasserzweckverband Liebenwalde
30. Trink- und Abwasserzweckverband Luckau
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31. Trink- und Abwasserzweckverband Dürrenhofe/Krugau
32. Trinkwasser- und Abwasserzweckverband Oderaue (TAZV 
Oderaue)
33. Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband ‘Beetzseegemeinden’
34. Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband ‘Der Teltow’
35. Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband Calau (WAC)
36. Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband Werder-Havelland
37. Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband ‘Ziesar’
38. Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband Beeskow und Umland
39. Wasser- und Abwasserverband Westniederlausitz
40. Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband Seelow
41. Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband Emster WAZV Emster
42. Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband Jüterbog- Fläming
43. Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband ‘Nieplitztal’
44. Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband ‘Nieplitz’
45. Wasser- und Abwasserverband ‘Havelland’
46. Wasser- und Abwasserverband Wittstock
47. Wasser- und Abwasserverband ‘Dosse’
48. Wasser- und Abwasserverband Rathenow
49. Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband ‘Panke/Finow’ c/o Stadtwerke 
Bernau GmbH
50. Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband Pritzwalk
51. Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband Blankenfelde-Mahlow
52. Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband Ahrensfelde/Eiche
53. Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband ‘Scharmützelsee- Storkow/
Mark’
54. Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband Schradenland
55. Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband ‘Mittelgraben’
56. Wasser- und Abwasserverband Elsterwerda
57. Wasser- und Abwasserzweckverband Hohenseefeld
58. Wasserver- und Abwasserentsorgungs- Zweckverband Region 
Ludwigsfelde (WARL)
59. Wasserverband ‘Kleine Elster’
60. Wasserverband Lausitz
61. Wasserverband Märkische Schweiz
62. Wasserverband Schlieben - WVS
63. Wasserverband Strausberg-Erkner
64. Wasserversorgungsverband Hoher Fläming
65. Westprignitzer Trinkwasser- und Abwasserzweckverband
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66. Zweckverband Wasser und Abwasser Fehrbellin
67. Zweckverband ‘Gewässerrandstreifenprojekt Spreewald’
68. Zweckverband ‘Havelländisches Luch’
69. Zweckverband Wasserversorgung und Abwasserentsorgung der 
Westuckermark
70. Zweckverband ‘Fließtal’
71. Zweckverband ‘Neue Bühne’ Niederlausitzer Theaterstädtebund 
Senftenberg
72. Zweckverband Abfallbehandlung Nuthe-Spree
73. Zweckverband Brandenburgisches Museum für Klein- und 
Privatbahnen in Gramzow/Uckermark
74. Zweckverband für Wasserversorgung und Abwasserentsorgung 
Eberswalde
75. Zweckverband Komplexsanierung Mittlerer Süden
76. Zweckverband Kremmen
77. Zweckverband Lausitzer Seenland Brandenburg
78. Zweckverband Ostuckermärkische Wasserversorgung und 
Abwasser- behandlung (ZOWA)
79. Zweckverband Wasserversorgung und Abwasserentsorgung 
Fürstenwalde und Umland
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